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ciples which they apply without hesitation in the case
of transactions essentially similar in economic sub-

stance

....

",40

LYNN F. MEYEis

Custody Of Minor Children Awarded To Third Party
Or Guilty Parent Over Innocent
And Fit Parentt
Oliver v. Oliver' and Trenton v. Christ2
Mr. Oliver filed a bill against his wife for a divorce
a vinculo matrimonii on the grounds of abandonment and
adultery, and for the custody of their three year old
daughter. The Chancellor granted the husband an absolute
divorce for abandonment, but not for adultery, and awarded
custody of the child to the wife. The husband appealed
both the custody decree and the lower court's denial of a
divorce on grounds of adultery. The Court of Appeals, in
affirming the lower court's decree, held that, while there
might have been sufficient evidence to warrant a granting
of the divorce on grounds of adultery, custody was properly
awarded to the appellee.
The parties were married in 1950 and separated in 1954,
at which time the appellee took her infant daughter with
her. During that period, the appellee had become friendly
with a fellow employee, Taylor Potter. In 1955, upon taking an apartment in Wheaton, Maryland, "the wife and
Potter became involved in a companionship not consistent
with a normal friendship between a virtuous woman and
a continent man."3 A private detective, hired by the appellant and testifying in the lower court, described his
observations of appellee's intimate conduct with Potter at
her apartment, and further averred that on several occasions Potter had visited the appellee at various hours
during the evening, not leaving for some period thereafter.
4Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contracts: II; 44 Yale L.J. 754, 779 (1935).
t Editor's Note. After the above casenote was written, the Court of
Appeals decided Melton v. Connolly, No. 145, September Term, 1958, ...
Md........
A. 2d ... (1959), in which, In awarding custody of a 5 year
old girl to foster parents, as against the father, the Court reaffirmed its
stand that the welfare of the child is the consideration of transcendent
Importance.
1217 Md. 222, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958), dis. op. 230.
2216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).
8
Supra, n. 1, 225-6.
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There was also testimony given by appellee's maid, sug-

gestive of immoral conduct, and alleging that the Oliver
child, still in her mother's company at the Wheaton apart-

ment, began to refer to Potter as "Daddy Taylor," often
speaking of "Daddy Taylor's pillow" on appellee's bed,
and "Daddy Taylor's toothbrush."4

On the basis of the testimony below, the Court of Appeals held, by a three to two decision, that the Chancellor
had not abused his discretion in awarding custody to appellee. The Court said that while custody of a child is
ordinarily not given to the guilty party in a divorce complaint, especially where the divorce is granted on grounds
of adultery, nevertheless, the best interests of the child
are the paramount criteria in determining custody; that
although appellant was a fit and competent parent, so was

appellee, having repented her indiscretions.

Judge Prescott, joined by Judge Macgill, specially assigned, dissented on the ground that this is the first case
where, in the absence of exceptional circumstances and
parental unfitness of the innocent party, the Court of Appeals has awarded custody of a child to an adulterous
spouse, and that the best interests of the child were not,
therefore, served by awarding custody to the appellee,
whose moral aberrations are, per se, evidence of unfitness.
Trenton v. Christ' also involved a custody award against
an innocent, fit, and competent parent, and to third persons
(in this case, to maternal grandparents) when the child's
mother, having had custody, died. Trenton (appellant)
and his wife were divorced in 1951, whereupon she and
her daughter went to live with her parents (the appellees).
Subsequently, the appellant remarried, and in 1956, he
moved to Wisconsin, as a result of his employer's having
transferred him to a job in neighboring Michigan. He had
a son by the second marriage, who, at the time of this
case, was three and one-half years old, blind and asthmatic.
In 1957, three and one-half months before appellant's suit
for custody, appellant's former wife was killed in an automobile accident. Shortly thereafter, appellant asked his
daughter, then ten years old, to come to Wisconsin with
him, and she acceded; on a later occasion, she refused to
accompany him, and as a result of that conversation with
her father, the child became ill.
Affirming the lower court's award of the child's custody
to the maternal grandparents, the Court of Appeals deter'Ibid.,

226.
5216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).
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mined that her best interests would be realized by leaving
her in a community where she was well adjusted and had
benefited from wise upbringing. Without impugning the
appellant's fitness, the Court surmised that a transfer of
custody would probably result in additional emotional
upheaval to the child, especially since her half-brother's
incapacity would necessitate a disproportionate showing
of parental love, care and attention to him. Moreover, because she would have had no prior opportunity to have developed profound attachments for new surroundings and
associations, it was feared that she might become antagonistic to both, thereby overwhelming the fondest efforts
of appellant and step-mother to reorient her, and to win
her affection.
Both of the subject cases uphold the theory that the
overriding consideration in the disposition of custody cases
is the best interests, or the general welfare of the child.
There is no precise legal application of the best interests
test; indeed, its efficacy results from determining the best
interests of a child on the peculiar factual circumstances
of any given case.7 For that reason, the Chancellor, who
has opportunity to observe the witnesses and parties in
court, and who therefore might better evaluate the testimony in its natural context, is usually accorded respect in
his findings when the appellate court reviews a custody
case (a principle also recognized in both of the subject
cases), unless the upper court discerns an abuse of discretion by the Chancellor, or, perhaps, after reviewing
the findings, entertains grave doubts as to his decision.'
In deciding what constitutes the best interests of the
child, the courts consider a number of component factors,
which affect the child's welfare. A major consideration,
for example, in Oliver v. Oliver' was that the child was a
three and on-half year old girl. Normally, where a child
is of tender years, it is best placed in the custody of its
mother, who is better endowed to provide care and devoted
6Swoyer v. Swoyer, 157 Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (1929) ; Dietrich v. Anderson,
185 Md. 103, 43 A. 2d 186 (1945) ; Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A.
2d 563 (1954) ; See also MADD)N, PERSONS AN DOMESTIO RELATIONS (1931),

§107.
7Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 272, 145 A. 614 (1929), in which the
court said: "A recital and analysis of the testimony in this case is wholly
unnecessary, in that no general principles can be laid down in this class of
cases which would govern in the future...."
aSingewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (1933); Sibley v.
Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 50 A. 2d 128 (1946) ; Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 62
A. 2d 293 (1948) ; Casey v. Casey, 210 Md. 464, 124 A. 2d 254 (1956).
p217 Md. 222, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958), d8. o0p. 230.
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attention. 10 However, what constitutes "tender years" is
not altogether clear." Another, correlative factor often
recognized is the sex of the child - girls are more likely
to be awarded to their mothers."
Custody awarded in divorce proceedings is more often
than not given to the innocent party, provided that he is
fit and competent," especially where the guilty party has
been grossly immoral or adulterous. 4 The typical rationale
of the award, where the parent has been guilty of grossly
immoral conduct, is that the child's association with the
parent would be inimical to its own best interests. 15 Judge
10Barnett v. Barnett, 144 Md. 184, 125 A. 51 (1923) ; cf. Miller v. Miller,
191 Md. 396, 62 A. 2d 293 (1948) and McCabe v. McCabe, ... Md. ... , 146 A.
2d 768 (1958) (custody given to father in both cases). Bronson, Custody
on Appeal, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 737 (1944), is particularly appropriate to the subject case. There, at page 742, the author says:
"One of the most often used 'presumptions' is that the child of tender
years should be awarded to his mother. If the custody of such a child
is In controversy the door is open for an easy way to dispose of the
issue. Following the above 'rule' the courts often look no farther than
to see If the mother has been deemed a fit person, and sometimes only
to see that she has not been affrmativley delared unfit. Perhaps human
experience supports the policy that young children should not be deprived of the care of their mothers ....
However, it is this writer's
opinion that even such 'sound general rules', as this one Is said to be,
should be used with caution in custody cases." [Emphasis supplied.]
"In Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 66 A. 2d 919 (1949), the court
treated a child of 10 as being of tender age; Casey v. Casey, 210 Md. 464,
474, 124 A. 2d 254 (1956) cited Cullotta v. Cullotta as holding that a child
under ten years of age falls within the classification; however, of. Carter
v. Carter, 156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929), where a child who was eight years
at the time of the appeal was not considered to be of such a tender age as
to require a mother's care. Brune, C. J., further warned in Sewell v. Sewell,
... Md ...
, 145 A. 2d 422, 427 (1958), that "this is not an inflexible rule".
2Porter
v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464 (1935) ; Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (19)
; McCann v. McCann, 167 Md. 167,
173 A. 7 (1934).
"Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 66 A. 2d 919 (1949) (divorce for
cruelty) ; Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 31 A. 2d 634 (1942) (divorce
for abandonment) ; Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 614 (1929) ;
Vogts v. Vogts, 189 Md. 312, 55 A. 2d 711 (1947); c. Wald v. Wald, 161
Md. 493, 159 A. 97 (1931).
"1Chillemi v. Chillemi, 197 Md. 257, 78 A. 2d 750 (1951) (husband finding mother in bed with a stranger while child is in the home) ; See Pangle
v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 170, 106 A. 337 (1919), where the Court warned:
"But in a case where the custody of a female child is sought by a
mother, after a separation caused by her adultery, the evidence should
be very clear as to the propriety and wisdom of such a course before
the child is removed from the care of the father to whom it has been
judicially awarded and by whom its best interests are being properly
protected."
Cf. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 143 A. 2d 874, 882 (1958),
where it is said that in case of the mother's adulterous misconduct, ". . . It
must appear that in spite thereof it is for the best interests and welfare
of the child to award custody to the mother". See also Swoyer v. Swoyer,
157 Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (1929).
"2 NELsON, DIvoRcE AND ANNULMENT (2d ed. 1945) §15.06; Swoyer v.
Swoyer, ibid.
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Horney speaking for the majority in the Oliver case,
either manifested a subtle departure from that presumption or hinted at its inapplicability, advising:
"While we do not agree that adultery must be
proven 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' we are unable
to say that the Chancellor was clearly wrong in granting the divorce on the ground of abandonment instead
of adultery. Moreover, we think the question is unimportant in this case. The real question here is the
custody of the child, and a determination of that question does not necessarily depend on the ground for divorce which entitled the husband to a decree."'16
There have been occasions where other considerations
have prompted granting custody to the guilty party in a
divorce suit, where the divorce was not decreed on grounds
of adultery, or where the guilty party had not been grossly
immoral.' 7 However, even if the Court of Appeals meant
to imply that Mrs. Oliver was guilty of adultery (in answering that moot divorce question, the husband already
having obtained an a vinculo divorce), the majority opinion
held, as have some cases, that custody may be awarded
to a formerly adulterous parent where a reform in conduct
has occurred which re-establishes the parent's fitness. 8
After declaring that in the court below Mrs. Oliver's un106217 Md. 222, 227, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958), dis. op. 230. [Emphasis supplied.] Judge Prescott's objection to the Court's decision is directed largely
at this statement, because a decision for the mother founded on such circumstances would not deter moral aberrations in the future and because the
father is humiliated by It. However, neither of these objections would concern the best interests of the child, which is the paramount consideration
in custody cases. See the statement to this effect in Koger v. Koger, 217
Md. 372, 376, 142 A. 2d 599 (1958).
"1Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563 (1954), where the
appellant father was impliedly of questionable character, even though
his wife had been found guilty of adultery. Judge Hammond in the Trudeau
case, placed the award in the guilty party on the basis of precedent laid
in Swoyer v. Swoyer, 157 Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (1929), and Pangle v. Pangle,
134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (1919), in both of which cases custody was given
to the innocent party, despite dictum that where the best interests of the
child justify it, the Chancellor could award custody to the adulterous
spouse. See also Koger v. Koger, 217 Md. 372, 142 A. 2d 599 (1958) (custody
given to the guilty party in divorce on grounds of desertion) ; and McCann
v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 173 A. 7 (1934), where the guilty party who was
not adulterous received custody. See also 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 564, 601.
8Hill v. Hill, Exr'x., 49 Md. 450, 33 Am. Rep. 271 (1878) (visiting
privileges given to adulterous mother, now reformed) ; Trudeau v. Trudeau,
204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563 (1954) (emphasizes that penitence Is more readily
accepted when the parent's moral aberrations occurred away from the
child) ; Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 50 A. 2d 128 (1946) (father, once
adulterous, now remarried and respectable). See also 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)
564, 601.
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fitness had not been established, the Court, apparently with
nothing more to support its conclusion than a showing that
the adulterous relationship under consideration had in
fact ended, also decided that she had reformed:
"The adulterous relationship had ceased, and it is
not likely that such illicit conduct will be revived
since the former paramour has moved to Michigan
and had become interested in marrying another woman
out there. The mother having changed her way of life,
the Chancellor was justified in overlooking her past
indiscretions."' 9
The Court added that "the lower court 'may at any
time * * * annul, vary or modify' the decree in relation
to the child. Code (1957), Art. 16, sec. 25".20
It would appear the Court of Appeals is reluctant to
deny that the best interests of a very young child lie with
its mother, provided that she is maternally fit regardless
of what fault or moral turpitude compelled a divorce decree
against her.
In Trenton v. Christ," the second case under examination, maternal grandparents were given, and the natural
father denied, custody of a ten year old girl, when she
had been in their exclusive custody for only three and
one-half months. At common law the father had a natural
right to the custody of his minor children. 2 Now, a prima
facie presumption is raised by statute that parents are
the best and preferred custodians of their children, 28 and
neither parent has a right superior to that of the other.24
The usual view is that the child's welfare will prevail if
it is left with the parents, 8 as against a third person, assuming that the parent is not deemed unfit and incompetent. 26
" 217 Md. 222, 230, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958).
0Ibid.
2 216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).

2See Jones v. Stockett, 2 B1. Ch. 409, circa 428 (Md. 1830), where there is
dictum to the effect that the natural right of the father to custody might
yield to the best interests of the child.
26 MD. CoDa (1957) Art. 72A, §1.
2 Ibid.; Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 62 A. 2d 293 (1948).
22
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT (2d ed. 1945) §15.15; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DomFsnc REMATIONS (1931) §107; Edwards v. Engledorf, 192
S.W. 2d 31, 33 (Mo. 1946), where the court said:
"The presumption is that the best interest of the child is to be In the
custody of the parent and In this situation a showing against the
parent overcoming such a presumption must be made or that there was
some special and extraordinary reason why such custody should not
be in the father."
2In
DeAngelis v. Kelly, 184 Md. 183, 187, 40 A. 2d 332 (1944), the Court
categorically declined to give custody to the great aunt of a child, who had
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Judicial cognizance of the natural, instinctive affections
of parents for their children is sometimes influential in
custody awards, but precedent does not support a conclusive rule.
Even conceding that the parent is the suitable custodian,
another factor, evidently not present in either subject case,
may supersede in establishing the child's best interests.
Where a parent has voluntarily relinquished custody of
his child to a third person, he may lose his natural rights
as a parent, and to revive them, must meet the burden of
proving that the child's welfare would be materially promoted by a reversion of custody. 2 The period of time during which a third person has had custody of children may
be a consideration, 29 especially when the parent, at the
cared for the child from the time she was three months old until she was
four and one-half, in these words: "We cannot find from the testimony that
her parents are not giving her the care to which she is entitled from those
in their station of life, and we think she should be left with them." See
Piatt v. Piatt, 32 Ida. 407, 184 P. 470 (1919), where the presumption of
natural right is stringently applied, in the absence of the parent's unfitness.
In Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P. 2d 637, 642 (1949), the court declared:
"It will suffice to say that if there is any language to be found in any
of our decisions justifying the construction that the children of natural
parents may be given to third persons without a finding such parent
is an unfit person to have their custody it should be and is hereby disapproved." [Emphasis supplied.]
See also State v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901 (1900) ; Jones v. Jones,
155 Kan. 213, 124 P. 2d 457 (1942) ; Wirth v. Wirth, 192 Md. 21, 63 A. 2d 312
(1949).
7
2 Recognition of natural bonds of affection is apparent in Schneider
v.
Hasson, 161 Md. 547, 550, 157 A. 739 (1932) (aunt could not love child as
much as mother did) ; Hill v. Hill, Exr'x., 49 Md. 450, 33 Am. Rep. 271
(1878) ; England v. Megear, 145 Md. 574, 579, 125 A. 731 (1924) (regard
for tender relation of mother and child). But see Pitts v. Pitts, 181 Md.
182, 192, 29 A. 2d 300 (1942) (custody given to mother, but custody should
not be given merely to gratify a mother's maternal love).
2State
v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. "302, 47 S.E. 2d 221, 226 (1948) states:
"'When a parent has transferred to another the custody of his infant child by fair agreement, which has been acted on by such other
person to the manifest interests and welfare of the child, the parent
will not be permitted to reclaim the custody of the child, unless he can
show that a change of custody will materially promote his child's
welfare, moral and physical'."
See Schneider v. Hasson, 161 Md. 547, 157 A. 739 (1932), where the Court
held there had been no relinquishment, after the child had been exclusively
with a great-aunt for two years. See also Beach v. LeRoy, 228 Ind. 122,
89 N.E. 2d 912 (1950); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, SEEC'rm
ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW (1950) 588, 591-592.
9Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 18 A. 2d 199 (1941)
(father denied
custody after a lapse of almost nine years) ; Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86
A. 2d 463 (1952) (third-party custodians given permanent custody after
boy had lived with them for ten years) ; Schneider v. Hasson, 161 Md. 547,
157 A. 739 (1932) (custody reconferred on mother two years after she had
voluntarily, but not permanently, relinquished it) ; Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan.
459, 201 P. 2d 637 (1949) (custody awarded to father after an absence of
eight and one-half years) ; MADEN, PERSONS AND DomEsTio RELATIONS
(1931) 374.
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same time, has remained aloof and indifferent to his
children. 0
Normally, the court will grant but scant acknowledgment to economic and social advantages offered by a third
person in a custody contest between him and a natural
parent, appearing reluctant to regard money or position
available from a third party as counter-balancing the benefits to be conferred on the child by remaining with its
natural parents.8 1
In the Trenton case, 2 the maternal grandparents freely
conceded that the appellant father had a preferred right to
custody of his daughter over third persons; furthermore, it
was agreed that the father would be a suitable custodian.
There is, in addition, legal authority to sustain the view
that upon the death of his former wife, who had been the
child's custodian, a presumption of a natural right to custody was revived in the father's favor.8 The grandparents,
by virtue of their lengthy and intimate association with
the child, had no similar right.8 4 In addition, their age and
its relation to the child's best interests, was not considered."
The question raised instead by the Court was whether
such exceptional circumstances existed as would justify
awarding the child to her grandparents.
The fact that she had, together with her mother, lived
with the grandparents for nearly seven years, and had become ill on suggestion of removal from her surroundings,
was influential in determining that her best interests would
10Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938).
81See Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY
LAw (1950) 588, 599, where the author, criticizing the refusal of courts
to consider the advantages which third persons can offer as a factor in
determining custody when the natural parents are fit and proper, admonishes: "Platitudes that tend to glorify apple-faced mediocrity and to
defeat the higher joys, excellencies, and achievements of life are particularly offensive when the future welfare of the child is Involved."
"216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 60 (1958).
"See 74 A.L.R. 1352. A few states have statutes giving the right of
custody to the surviving spouse; for an example of how such statutes are
construed in determining the right to custody of a surviving spouse as
against that of a third person, see Edwards v. Engledorf, 192 S.W. 2d 31,
33 (Mo., 1946).
"In Burns v. -Bines, 189 Md. 157, 164, 55 A. 2d 487 (1947), where the
mother of several children was dead, and the father was in prison for her
murder, the paternal grandparents of the children obtained custody of a
grandson from the maternal grandparents, who were caring for all three
grandchildren, on a writ of habeas corpus. In reversing the lower court,
the Court of Appeals said that since "grandparents have no 'right' to
custody", the paternal grandparents had invoked the wrong procedure.
"Schneider v. Hasson, 161 Md. 547, 550, 157 A. 739 (1932) (custody
denied to a relative whose advanced age is contrary to the best interests
of the child) ; Ex Parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 133 A. 2d 408 (1957) (adoption denied to appellants, partly by reason of their advanced age).
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lie where she had developed profound and secure attachments. On grounds of promulgating the child's greatest
welfare, the courts seek to avoid severance of deep-rooted
and accustomed associations with friends and relatives
by awarding custody to a party who would take the child
out of the state;36 in this case, the father would have taken
the child to his home in Wisconsin. Certainly ties of affection engendered and strengthened by long associations with
third persons will not be ignored.3 7 Frequently, because
associations have been formed, and deep affections have
developed, a child will become emotionally or physically
ill upon separation from his third-party custodians, and to
preserve his best interests, the court will respect the status
quo. In the Trenton case, the Court observed that "mere
contemplation of [a] change produced a serious emotional
upset," which presented "a genuine risk to [the] child's
well-being."3 8
In establishing the best interests of the Trenton child,
the Court also accorded some degree of deference to the
child's own wishes. While the child's preference, when he
or she has reached an "age of discretion,"3 9 is ordinarily
entitled to consideration,' it is not conclusively binding
on the court, particularly where the child's preference is
ill-founded.4
It is interesting to note that the child here had a brother,
and that, although there is a tendency for courts, in up6Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563 (1954); State v.
Vorlicek, 229 Minn. 497, 40 N.W. 2d 350 (1949). Perhaps the underlying
reason in many instances for the court's policy is the realization that, should
the child be removed from the state by its custodian, it will obviously also
be removed from the supervision of the court.
I"Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 119, 43 A. 2d 186 (1945), where the
Court states: "...
the prosperity and welfare of the child depend on the
number and strength of these ties....
" See MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc
RELATIONS

(1931) 376.

8 216 Md. 418, 423, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341,
353, 86 A. 2d 463 (1952) (holding that the child's health would be jeopardized or its happiness marred by a change in custody) ; State v. Vorlicek, 229
Minn. 497, 40 N.W. 2d 350, 352 (1949) recognized this factor, but in doing
so, stated the case was exceptional; c. Sass v. Sass, 246 Wis. 272, 16 N.W.
2d 829 (1944), where the court felt that mere emotional disturbance as a
normal consequence of a transfer from one environment to another was an
insufficient factor to warrant denying the parents custody.
8' "There is no fixed age when the discretion of a child begins, but mental
capacity is the test." MADDEN, Op. cit. supra, n. 37, 377. In the subject case
the child was deemed by the court to be intelligent and well developed.
"0Young v. Weaver, 185 Md. 328, 44 A. 2d 748 (1945) ; Brault v. Brault,
189 Md. 175, 55 A. 2d 497 (1947) ; Vogts v. Vogts, 189 Md. 312, 55 A. 2d 711
(1947) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 199 Md. 594, 87 A. 2d 604 (1952) ; Wilhelm v.
Wilhelm, 214 Md. 80, 133 A. 2d 423 (1957) ; Cooley v. Washington, 136 A.
2d 583 (D.C. App. 1957).
1Casey v. Casey, 210 Md. 464, 124 A. 2d 254 (1956).
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holding the best interests of the child, to prevent the
separation of brothers and sisters by the custody decree,42
nonetheless, the situation might well vary where they had
never met. In fact, the Court apprehended in the subject
case that the relationship might be detrimental, saying:
"Instead of the love and devotion which might be
expected to develop between herself and her handicapped brother,
there might develop something quite
43
different."

While dicta stating that parental rights are subordinate to the child's best interests are plentiful, cases which
actually award custody to a third party where the natural
parent is a fit guardian and where there has been no relinquishment of natural rights are rare. Seldom do the
best interests of a child require its retention by another
while the parent is faultless, capable, and desirous of the
companionship of his offspring. 4
In Ross v. Pick,4 for example, the Court of Appeals de-

nied the petition of a divorced mother, now remarried, who,
after an absence of ten years, sought to regain custody of
her eleven year old son from his adoptive parents. The
case is obviously distinguishable from the subject case, in
that the adoption of the child would tend to indicate a final
relinquishment by the mother, but the court employed
language applicable to the Trenton case, declaring:
"... the court should place the right of the parents
subordinate to the right of those who performed the
parental duties, for the ties of companionship strengthen
by lapse of time, and upon the strength of
'4 these ties
the welfare of the child largely depends."

In Piotrowski v. State, the natural father of a nine year
old girl had taken her to the home of her maternal grandparents shortly after birth and on the death of her mother.
" Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 161 A. 269 (1932) ; Burns v. Bines,
189 Md. 157, 55 A. 2d 487 (1947) ; Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 123 A.
2d 354 (1956) ; Young v. Weaver, 185 Md. 328, 44 A. 2d 748 (1945).
" Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 423, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).
"Although the courts generally declare that the best interests of the child
will triumph over parental rights, even when the parent is fitand proper,
the rule is somewhat nebulous and elusive, because in the vast majority of
cases where custody is given to a third person, the parent Is either found,
on closer examination, to be tainted with one fault or another, or to have
relinquished custody of his child.
199 Md. 341, 86 A. 26 463 (1952).
-Ibid., 352.
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He visited the child frequently until he remarried about
three years later, thereafter visiting her less often. Reversing a lower court decree awarding him custody, the
Court noted that the child had flourished in her grandparents' home, and did not "deem it advisable to remove
her from this care, affection and attention. 4 7 This case
might well appear in point, were it not that the father
had commended his daughter to her grandparents' custody
after his wife had died; i.e., she was in their exclusive custody for almost nine years, while in the Trenton4 8 case the
father brought custody proceedings three and one-half
months after the death of his wife, who had been given
custody when she and Mr. Trenton were divorced.
In Beach v. LeRoy,49 the Supreme Court of Indiana
affirmed a decision of the lower court continuing the custody of an infant girl in her grandparents, to whose home
the mother, upon the death of her husband, had taken the
child. After six years, the mother, having in the meantime
remarried, endeavored to reclaim the child from the grandparents. In a dictum, the Court stated that:
"It does not follow that because the appellant mother
is now a fit person, and that she is now financially able
and naturally and materially equipped to have the
care and custody of the infant child, that the judgment must be for her. There are many other things
incident to the life-history and the disposition of the
child in question ... that the courts must consider in
fixing the present care and custody of the child." 0
However, here, too, the Court implied through other
language that something in the nature of a voluntary relinquishment by the mother had occurred.
Although in the Trenton case, the father only saw his
child on the average of four times per year, there is no
intimation anywhere in the opinion that this amounted
to relinquishment.
The Trenton case, then, would appear to hold that the
best interests of a child supersede any natural rights of
a fit parent who has not relinquished his prima facie right
to custody by defeating or ignoring his child's best interests, just as the same general welfare test would subordi" 179 Md. 377, 383, 182 A. 199 (1941).
"216 Md. 418, 140 A. 2d 660 (1958).
9228 Ind. 122, 89 N.E. 2d 912 (1950).
- Ibid., 914.
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nate the claims of a faultless and innocent parent in a divorce suit, as was decided in Oliver v. Oliver.1
Maryland courts tend to follow the view suggested by
Judge Hammond's dissent in Ex Parte Frantum:
"Precedents and theories should never control the
decision of a custody or adoption case since the answer
to the question of what is for the best interests and
welfare of the child necessarily depends on judgment
applied to a set of facts and circumstances which, like
the proverbial will, has no twin brother."52
Perhaps optimum results would obtain by combining
the observations of trained social workers with the authority of the judiciary, either (1) in a single individual,
the Friend of the Court, used in Michigan, who maintains
constant vigilance over innumerable details affecting the
child's best interests;5 3 or (2) by establishing, either
through judicial decision or statute, a power in the courts
whereby, as parens patriae,they, on their own initiative,
may order investigations by experienced welfare workers
and probation officers in custody cases.5 4
BENJAMIN

N. Do~mAN

Retroactive Sales And Use Taxes Unconstitutional
Comptroller v. Glenn L. Martin Co.'
The plaintiff appellee, Martin, is the manufacturer of
aircraft, aircraft parts, and missiles for use by the military.
During the Korean War the Federal government engaged
Martin to produce weapons to carry out its military operations. Because of its limited capital, Martin was unable to
produce the aircraft in the desired quantities, so the contracts for production, two with the Navy and one with the
Air Force, contained stipulations by which the govern51217 Md. 222, 140 A. 2d 908 (1958).
214 Md. 100, 133 A. 2d 408 (1957), di8. op. 107; cf. Edwards v. Engledorf,
192 S.W. 2d 31, 34 (Mo. 1946), where the court, taking custody from a
grandmother with whom the child has spent most of his life, ". . . regrets to
have to decide cases of this character. * * * In this situation sentiment
makes a strong appeal, but courts cannot be governed by sentiment.
Sympathy must give way to the cold facts and the law." See n. 33, supra.
"See Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 737 (1944).
"See 35 A.L.R. 2d 629, 632, naming Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Mexico, Texas, and the District of Columbia as recognizing
such procedures; see also Boone v. Boone, 150 F. 2d 153 (D.C. App. 1945).
1216 Md. 235, 140 A. 2d 288 (1958) ; cert. den.

